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The COVID-19 outbreak has seen people in many countries asked to radically modify
their way of life in compliance with sweeping safety measures. During the current crisis,
technology is turning out to be key, in that it allows practitioners to deliver psychological
services to people who would otherwise be unreachable. However, professionals cannot
solely rely on their traditional modes of practice, in that different methods are required
to bring to light the needs of those affected by the emergency. People are being
overwhelmed by a cascade of unusual and unexpected events that are putting a strain
on their everyday routines and usual meaning-making systems; ongoing challenges to
their employment and financial status will likely divert personal resources away from
psychological well-being. We therefore argue that psychologists should also consider
the needs of the general population. Among those who may require help–aside from the
main targets of psychological intervention, such as healthcare personnel and COVID-
19 patients and their relatives–specific attention should be paid to those who are not
at the center of the crisis. We suggest that this large segment of potential users may
benefit from a non-medical approach focused on the promotion of meaning-making
processes. Indeed, the disruptive nature of the current situation hinders sense-making
and threatens to undermine psychological balance and well-being, at an individual as
well as at a societal level. The present article proposes a methodological perspective
based on the reconstruction of meaning-making processes (sense of coherence,
predictability, metaphors, narratives). Specifically, psychological interventions should
promote personal and collective resources with a view to: “normalizing” current
distressful experiences (i.e., acknowledging that such reactions are normal in light
of the present situation); widening the observational field, taking relational contexts
into account, and promoting an understanding of distressful experiences as coping
strategies; fostering meaning-making/reconstruction processes through the use of
appropriate metaphors and narratives; promoting a sense of coherence. We present
two clinical vignettes to illustrate how these principles might be applied in practice. In
conclusion, the exceptional psychological challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic
require practitioners to adopt a broad and flexible perspective on clinical intervention.
Keywords: COVID-19, psychological distress, meaning construction process, sense of coherence (SOC), limits of
the biomedical model, general population, clinical psychology, resilience
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INTRODUCTION
The recent coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak has seen
people in many countries asked to radically modify their
everyday behaviors in compliance with sweeping safety measures
introduced by European, Asian, and American governments.
It is well documented that having to cope with infectious
outbreaks places a considerable strain on people’s lives1 (see
Brooks et al., 2020; Pfefferbaum and North, 2020). During
the COVID-19 crisis, entire populations have suddenly found
themselves struggling with an invisible enemy that can potentially
strike anyone and may only be confronted by forgoing–although
temporarily–the company of significant others and enduring
severe reductions in living space and personal freedoms.
In view of the above, it is our opinion that scholars should
extend their research focus beyond those “in the frontline,” such
as healthcare personnel, COVID-19 patients, and their relatives,
to investigate the impact of the emergency on the public at
large, given that “emotional distress is ubiquitous in [populations
affected by public health emergencies]–a finding certain to be
echoed in populations affected by the COVID-19 pandemic”
(Pfefferbaum and North, 2020, p. 1). Indeed, recent works have
pointed up the need to study the “psychological effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic across the whole population and in specific
vulnerable groups” (Holmes et al., 2020, p. 10) in light of the
clearly adverse effects of quarantining on psychological well-
being (Brooks et al., 2020) and long-lasting stressors related to
the outbreak (Sood, 2020).
The negative effects of forced and prolonged
mass quarantining include boredom, loneliness, social
disconnectedness, a sense of lack of meaning, relationship
breakdowns, anger, avoidance behaviors, unhealthy behaviors,
and abnormal emotional reactions (Brooks et al., 2020; Holmes
et al., 2020; Pfefferbaum and North, 2020). The unavailability
of routine assistance due to the closure of businesses and
institutions can further amplify the impact of the crisis,
potentially affecting large sectors of the population: consider,
for example, families with schoolchildren, persons living alone,
elderly persons and their caregivers, unemployed persons, those
on a low income, people in unstable social conditions, homeless
persons, and other vulnerable categories (see World Health
Organization, 2020). It is also likely that the pandemic will have
enduring psychological consequences on an unprecedentedly
global scale in the later stages of mass home confinement (when
freedom of movement has been at least partially restored) and
over the long-term aftermath of the lockdown. A recent survey
by the American Psychological Association (2020) revealed that
the pandemic has altered all aspects of personal and family life,
from health and work to education and exercise. Parents of
children under 18 are among the categories most affected by
pandemic-related stress. The emergency has upset daily routines
(during both the initial lockdown and the ongoing phase of
1There is evidence that pandemics may also have positive effects, such as
strengthening individual resilience, increasing levels of social cohesion, and
fostering positive concern about mental health (Perrin et al., 2009; Pfefferbaum
and North, 2020).
gradual resumption of normal activity),2 severely impinging
upon personal as well as family and interpersonal projects and
drastically modifying habitual modes of interaction at both the
familial and social levels.
The nature of the disease itself prompts significant uncertainty
about the future. People’s concerns can be many and varied,
spanning fears for their occupational and financial status during
the recovery phase; anxiety surrounding new behaviors that
the epidemiological situation may require them to adopt in
the interests of their personal safety (such as novel modes of
interacting with strangers, alternative workplace procedures or
leisure-time activities, etc.); worry that a new wave of disease may
hit the world, or that we may have to live with the virus for a
long time to come. It is likely that such sources of distress will
wield a profound effect on community mental health, although
not necessarily in terms of diagnosable disorders.
Policy makers and psychological scientists thus need to be
keenly aware of the wide-ranging psychological impact of the
pandemic if they are to design targeted psychological surveillance
and intervention strategies for helping people to cope with it (see
Higgins, 2020).
Accordingly, this paper presents a possible perspective on
addressing COVID-induced forms of distress–which are often
subtle and elusive, but, nevertheless, worthy of attention–in
people who are not at the center of the crisis, that is to say,
those impacted by safety measures but not necessarily directly
affected by COVID-19. First, in the “Critical Issues for the
Delivery of Psychological Assistance During the COVID-19
Outbreak” section, we acknowledge the key role of technology in
providing access to, or ensuring the continuity of, psychological
services to this population. We also flag conceptual issues with
interventions–whether technologically mediated or face-to-face–
that are strongly rooted in the biomedical model and draw on a
symptom-centered approach. While recognizing the importance
of taking symptoms into account in all clinical intervention
contexts, we argue that symptom-centered approaches may be of
limited benefit when applied to forms of distress whose diagnostic
status is unclear (or inexistent).
We therefore suggest that a broader perspective on
psychological intervention is needed. In the “Making Sense
of COVID-19: Routine, Predictability, Narrative, Sense of
Coherence, and Resilience” section, we explore the link between
COVID-19-related distress and the disruption of meaning, going
on to outline key theoretical aspects of the meaning-making
process, such as routine, predictability, narratives, sense of
coherence, and resilience. Then, in the “Enhancing Processes of
Meaning Making About COVID-19 in the General Population”
section, we describe a multipronged perspective on psychological
intervention, whose main features are coherent communication
strategies, the de-pathologization of distressful reactions to
the pandemic, a widening of the field of observation from
individuals to their relational contexts, and the negotiation of
suitable personalized metaphors for enhancing psychological
well-being. In the “Clinical Vignettes” section, we present two
2The disruption of previous routines and the need to adjust to new ones represent
a major source of stress for 74% of American parents.
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clinical vignettes to practically illustrate how our proposed
perspective might be applied in practice. Finally, in the
“Concluding Remarks” section, we conclude by summarizing
the broad criteria that we believe should inform intervention
targeting COVID-19-induced psychological issues.
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE DELIVERY
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE
DURING THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK
The situation in countries that have implemented mass home
confinement in response to the COVID-19 outbreak raises
serious mental health concerns. However, policy makers dealing
with large-scale public health challenges typically overlook
recommendations to supplement physical health interventions
with mental health programs (Perrin et al., 2009). Due to
the perception that physical assistance is more crucial or
urgent, and the awareness that enormous financial, political,
and even communication resources are required to address the
epidemiological aspects of pandemics, the psychological impact
of the emergency may only receive attention at a later stage.
Clearly, this has major implications for people’s mental health
and the availability of psychological assistance, compounding the
critical factors that already routinely hinder access to mental
health services.
Under normal conditions, a high proportion of people
suffering from mental health problems do not receive care. It
is well documented that the barriers to seeking treatment are
attitudinal rather than structural. In other words, people are
more frequently hindered from looking for help by their own
thoughts and beliefs than by practical obstacles to accessing
psychological services (such as a lack of financial resources,
transportation, or availability). In a World Health Organization
(WHO) study conducted by Andrade et al. (2014) in 24
countries, people with mental health issues reported not seeking
treatment for two main reasons: 1. They wished to handle
the problem independently. 2. Their self-perceived need for
treatment was low, associated with the expectation that the
problem would get better on its own. Now, in a pandemic
scenario where the greatest emphasis is understandably laid on
physical protection and the implementation of effective safety
measures, it is likely that such attitudinal barriers may impact
even further on people’s willingness to ask for psychological
assistance, at least in the initial stages of the emergency. We
further hypothesize that a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic
will lead individuals to increasingly focus on ongoing challenges
to their employment and financial status, and that this can
easily lead them to divert personal resources away from caring
for their mental health. Such a dynamic may be exacerbated
by two concurrent factors. First, media and government
communications about the risks associated with the pandemic
and the safety measures to be adopted are frequently perceived
as inadequate, alarming, and even contradictory (see Brooks
et al., 2020), while the style, approach, and content of media
and government communications can accentuate perceptions
that some issues are more urgent than others, thus influencing
the focus of people’s attention. Second, growing recourse to
drugs for stress-related symptoms may favor the adoption of
shallow solutions to complex problems (Ao, 2020; Pesce, 2020).
Furthermore, while the sample in the above-cited study by
Andrade and colleagues was assessed using a DSM-IV-based
diagnostic approach, in the current pandemic, people may suffer
from forms of distress that are not strictly ascribable to traditional
psychopathology or that fall below the diagnostic threshold and
are therefore less immediately recognizable. Hence, during a
pandemic, a lack of psychological surveillance is likely to become
a major problem due to the combined effects of all these factors.
There is a severe risk that people’s psychological needs will remain
unexpressed and untreated.
In a scenario like the present emergency, the use of technology
to provide psychological assistance is turning out to be key,
as the only viable way to overcome the necessary barrier
of obligatory physical distancing. This last-mentioned concept
has very recently replaced that of social distancing (Gunnell
et al., 2020), in acknowledgment of the distinction between
social connections and physical connections, and reflecting
the fact that the former may be ensured by technological
devices, while the latter are generally precluded during large-scale
sheltering in place.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze
in depth the use of technological devices for psychological
purposes, we should note the undoubted advantages of deploying
technology during an infectious outbreak. First, research has
documented the efficacy of mental health services mediated by
technological devices3 in targeting psychiatric disorders across a
range of populations and settings (Bashshur et al., 2016; Hubley
et al., 2016; Ebert et al., 2018; Shore et al., 2020). Second, the
deployment of technology is generally accepted and positively
evaluated by clients (Bashshur et al., 2016; Hubley et al., 2016).
Third, through the use of technological devices, psychological
assistance can be made virtually available to all those who
need it, including persons living in isolated regions or those
whose liberty of movement is most severely restricted. Fourth,
technology-based intervention is financially advantageous for
clients, practitioners, and healthcare institutions alike (see
Bashshur et al., 2016). Finally, technological mediation may
mitigate the shame and stigma associated with attending
psychological services, thus facilitating access to mental health
assistance (Ebert et al., 2018). In sum, the psychological
community has a duty to avail of technology to efficaciously
deliver psychological interventions to the population at large.
However, despite the huge potential offered by the online
medium, certain limitations of most of the technologically
mediated psychological services currently on offer should be
noted. As Bashshur et al. (2016), as well as Ebert et al. (2018),
have pointed out, mediated services are generally designed
and delivered in keeping with standard cognitive behavior
therapy (CBT) principles. In other words, due to the features
of technological devices and the type of interaction that they
3A variety of labels are used in the literature to indicate these practices:
telemedicine applied to mental health, telepsychology, mediated services, Internet-
and mobile-based intervention.
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typically support, these services most frequently target changes
in specific behaviors and thoughts and are therefore particularly
suited to treating specific psychopathological conditions such as,
for example, panic disorders, and PTSD (Bashshur et al., 2016;
Hubley et al., 2016). However, telepsychology is a multifaceted
and evolving area comprising multiple kinds of services with
diverse features. To simplify somewhat, one main type of
intervention is closely modeled on face-to-face interaction:
the practitioner/client relationship (whether in the area of
counseling, education, psychotherapy, supportive intervention,
etc.) is merely transferred to a different (technological)
medium. Another group comprises more focused interventions,
including interactive self-help lessons, virtual or augmented
reality exposure-based techniques, serious games, avatar-led
sessions, and others.
Both types of intervention–whether or not directly based
on CBT principles–tend to be symptom centered, that is to
say, they target discrete, well-defined symptoms,4 using current
diagnostic systems such as the DMS-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) and the ICD-11 (World Health Organization,
2018).5 There is ample evidence that this approach is rooted in
a biomedical model of clinical intervention that has influenced
clinical psychology more profoundly than is commonly believed
(Henriques, 2002; Deacon, 2013; Frances, 2013; Castiglioni and
Laudisa, 2015). Analogously to its treatment of bodily ailments,
the biomedical model conceptualizes forms of mental distress
as diseases, that is to say, as clusters of interconnected and
concurrent symptoms (with diagnostic status) that form a single
framework of disease (Hucklenbroich, 2017). It consequently
emphasizes the development and delivery of disorder-specific
treatments (Deacon, 2013), such as manualized interventions,
behavior protocols, and skills training.
Now, what aspects of the biomedical model might turn out
to be problematic when addressing the distress caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic and its direct and indirect consequences?
In answer, let us focus on two conceptual features of this model.
First, as stated above, it presupposes a sort of isomorphism
between bodily problems and mental problems. Mental health
4In the interests of epistemological clarity, let us here summarize our perspective
on “symptoms” throughout this paper: Far from viewing them as mere “facts,”
we conceptualize symptoms (and their diagnosis) as–at least in part–theoretical
constructs. Indeed, “one of the major conclusions from the philosophical analysis
of science after the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the
20th century has been that there is no such thing as notions of ‘experience’,
‘fact’, ‘evidence’, and the like (including ‘symptom’), which are not theoretically
informed. In the wake of the tradition begun by philosophers and historians of
science such as Hanson and Kuhn, a common place of contemporary philosophy
of science is that any piece of scientifically relevant ‘evidence’ is, in fact, theory
laden (Hanson, 1958), that is to say, it is meaningful only when viewed as part
of a theoretical framework” (Castiglioni and Laudisa, 2015, p. 4). Nevertheless, in
light of the specific aims of this paper, we do not set out here to make a systematic
critique of the traditional diagnostic approach.
5We acknowledge that the weaknesses attributed to the biomedical model certainly
extend beyond the boundaries of CBT and indeed concern many models of
psychological intervention. However, we also note that most of the interventions
offered during the pandemic–whether face-to-face or technologically mediated–
have been based on CBT principles, given the core features of this approach (i.e.,
symptom centeredness, focus on rapid interventions, replicability of interventions,
quantifiability of results, etc.). These features make the CBT model particularly
apt to be chosen for intervention in emergency situations such as the COVID-19
pandemic.
issues are understood as forms of dysfunction, that is to
say, as problematic (i.e., prejudicial) deviations from normal,
physiological functioning. Thus, mental symptoms are viewed
as signals that something is going wrong inside the individual:
sources of distress are viewed as endogenous, while external
factors only influence the expression of inner causes (see
Slife et al., 2017). This perspective strongly favors biological
explanations for mental health issues (Henriques, 2002; Deacon,
2013; Johnstone and Boyle, 2018).
Second, the biomedical model frames mental problems as
relatively context independent, where context is understood
as the social, situational, relational, and local conditions or
circumstances in which a particular phenomenon occurs (see
VandenBos, 2015). In principle, from a biomedical perspective,
the diagnostic process may be conceptualized in two ways:
as a part-whole explanation, whereby all symptoms are
manifestations or components of the disease, or as a causal
explanation, whereby all symptoms of a disease are connected
by a causal chain (Hucklenbroich, 2017). In both cases, the
conceptual resolution, although different in degree, is narrower
in focus, centering on a sort of micro-context whose elements
are internal to the individual (such as personality traits,
reinforcement histories, cognitions, etc.) and proximal to the
cluster of symptoms (hence generally biological in nature) (see
Slife et al., 2017). This is because if symptoms are envisaged
as impersonal displays of a discrete disease (see Hucklenbroich,
2017), understanding and diagnosing mental health issues will
be seen as relatively independent of other specific situations or
circumstances pertaining to the broader context where these
issues have arisen (see Bradford, 2010; Jacobs and Cohen, 2010).
This meso/macro-context, whose elements are distal to the cluster
of symptoms and interpersonal in nature, thus becomes marginal
to understanding an individual’s distress. In sum, such an
approach “assigns a secondary role to the social world as a source
of ‘triggers’ or ‘stressors’ and offers a particular construction of
the person, often as biologically different and vulnerable (. . .)”
(Johnstone and Boyle, 2018, p. 90).
Hence, symptom-centered approaches grounded in the
biomedical model bear methodological as well as practical
implications when addressing mental health issues arising
due to infectious outbreaks. On the one hand, they fail
to acknowledge that forms of distress they label as mental
problems might be better understood as coping strategies–
although painful and onerous in terms of emotional resources–
deployed to face extraordinary environmental circumstances
(Bentall, 2009; Herman, 2015). They therefore risk overlooking or
underestimating the active stance that an individual must adopt
in order to cope responsibly with pandemic-related issues. On the
other hand, symptom-centered approaches focus heavily on the
disability associated with the problem under scrutiny, that is, the
impairment interfering with the individual’s ability to function in
one or more key life domains (VandenBos, 2015). This emphasis
may hinder the development and leverage of personal, familial,
and social resources for dealing with distressing experiences; on
the contrary, it may amplify the shame, guilt, and stigma often
experienced in relation to mental health problems (Bentall, 2009;
Deacon, 2013).
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This said, a caveat is in order here. We are not suggesting
that symptom-centered approaches are to be rejected. We
acknowledge that the treatment of symptoms is a key component
of all clinical interventions targeting specific manifestations of
distress. Furthermore, symptoms may be conceptualized as the
“tip of the iceberg,” so to speak, in that they often offer access
to a client’s needs and system of meanings. Indeed, symptoms
are frequently the reason individuals decide to request a clinical
consultation in the first place, as well as the conduit linking
the client’s needs with the clinician’s competence. Hence, a
careful clinical assessment of symptoms is a key component of
any psychological intervention, regardless of the practitioner’s
clinical orientation.
Rather, we contend that: 1. Symptom-centered techniques
(whether technologically mediated or not) may prove inadequate
when used as stand-alone interventions, encouraging a
mechanistic reading of complaints and treatment that is
exclusively aimed at bringing about the remission of symptoms.
2. They may be unhelpful in cases of milder and/or blurred
symptomatology, or manifestations of distress that do not fully
meet any given set of diagnostic criteria (see Deacon, 2013).
These considerations are relevant to the COVID-19 emergency
insofar as we may reasonably assume that the most common
sources of distress during infectious outbreaks do not necessarily
give rise to classical mental health conditions, in terms of either
intensity of distress (i.e., milder and/or subtle forms of distress
may be the norm) or quality of subjective experience (i.e., they
will likely generate new ways of coping with novel stressors).
We therefore argue that the marked influence of the
biomedical model on most psychological practices–including
those that are technologically mediated–risks undermining
psychological responses to the challenges posed by the COVID-
19 outbreak to the population at large.
MAKING SENSE OF COVID-19:
ROUTINE, PREDICTABILITY,
NARRATIVE, SENSE OF COHERENCE,
AND RESILIENCE
As described above, the COVID-19 pandemic is generating a set
of long-lasting triggers that are highly disruptive of the processes
by which people usually make sense of their lives. It poses serious
challenges, at a variety of levels, to the systems we all use (both
individually and socially) to construct a meaningful sense of the
world we live in and even of ourselves. Within the constructivist
paradigm6 (Neimeyer and Mahoney, 1995; Raskin and Bridges,
2002; Neimeyer, 2009), meaning construction is seen as the most
6By “constructivist paradigm” we mean a sort of broad theoretical “umbrella”
encompassing a range of theories, which in, some cases, are different, and “rival”
to each other (Kuhn, 1962-1970). Attempting to analyze the differences between
the positions of individual scholars would mean initiating a huge and potentially
never-ending epistemological debate. Such an analysis would fall far outside the
scope of this paper. The present article, whose specific focus is the impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic, is generally informed by the constructivist perspective.
For each of the main points in our argument, we cite the authors whose work
we consider most salient. All the scholars whose work we draw on may be
viewed as belonging to the “extended family” of constructivism, in all its different
central factor in human psychological life, a key to understanding
both typical and atypical mental functioning.
Meaning making is a complex and multilayered process that
includes cultural, linguistic, social, familial, and psychological
(cognitive and emotional) components, among others. Together,
these elements give rise to a lived, dynamic sense of intentionality
and selfhood. Given the nature and variety of its constituents,
meaning is never entirely individually constructed: it is
something that we both “make and find” (Shotter, 1993, p. 77).
In the specific domain of mental suffering, Guidano (1991,
pp. 56–60) defined psychopathology as a “science of meaning,”
proposing that “personal meaning organization” shapes the
meaning-making process that undergirds the development of
self, lending coherence and stability to personal identity (citation
omitted for anonymous peer review, Castiglioni et al., 2014).
Hence, most forms of mental distress derive from a disruption (or
interruption) to meaning making.7 For example, in depression
(one of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic viewed
as most likely and harmful by WHO), “depressed persons
often report that they feel disconnected from the world, that it
appears as an empty place deprived of all meaning” (Jacobs, 2013,
p. 2, italics added).
As long documented in the literature (Kelly, 1955; Bruner,
1990, 1991), there is a close (psycho)logical link between routine,
predictability, and meaning. The disruption of everyday routines
renders the world unpredictable, thus interfering with sense
making, a process that according to Kelly (1955) relies on the
ability to “predict and control events.” In circumstances such
as these, time–one of the core dimensions of human life–is
deeply impacted: the present is “suspended” (a phenomenon
that applies particularly to the confinement phase of managing
the pandemic); the past no longer provides the wherewithal to
interpret the current situation; the future becomes unpredictable,
and all capacity for forward planning is arrested, given that
most aspects of everyday reality have become fuzzy and
unrecognizable, causing disorientation and the inability to act (a
phenomenon that is typical of the current recovery phase).
The multifaceted process of meaning making described above
organizes and expresses itself through metaphors and narratives.
Metaphors serve to provide us with an idea of something that is
hitherto unknown to us by associating it with an object we already
varieties and with all its different nuances. This should be sufficient–for the specific
purposes of the present work–to ensure the overall epistemological coherence
of our proposed perspective, leaving the analysis of the different constructivist
positions to other works (see for example, to limit the field to clinical psychology:
quotations omitted for anonymous peer review; Neimeyer and Mahoney, 1995;
Castiglioni and Faccio, 2010; Castiglioni, 2011). Importantly, the key constructs on
which we have based our perspective display a degree of commonality. Specifically,
they share the following common points, which may be viewed as alternative to
the premises of the biomedical model: (a) a focus on the importance of meaning-
making processes; (b) an emphasis on the “embeddedness” of such processes in
social/relational contexts.
7From a “general” constructivist standpoint, we might say that mental distress
arises when one feels that one’s usual system of meanings has become useless,
unavailable, or unsound for the purposes of making sense of one’s current situation.
Hence, the existing meaning-making system is “interrupted” or “suspended”
before it has been possible to elaborate a sufficiently satisfactory “alternative type of
construction” (whether by extending/further modifying the old one or by replacing
it with a new one): no viable sense making (whether personal or “social”) appears
to be currently possible (Kelly, 1955; Feixas et al., 2009).
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know (Battistelli, 2020), a function that bears similarities to the
process of “anchoring” described by Moscovici et al. (2001) in his
theory of social representations.8
Narratives are stories, based on metaphors, that convey the
meaning of events in our lives over time (Polkinghorne, 2004;
Squire et al., 2014); they thus offer a useful guide to interpreting
and dealing with unfamiliar phenomena. “Narrative is a form of
discourse that links events together across time, and thus, it can
display the temporal dimension of human existence. Narrative
form captures the notion that human lives are ‘becomings’ or
journeys in which actions and happenings occur before, after, and
at the same time as other actions and happenings” (Polkinghorne,
2004, p. 58).
Due to their discursive nature, narratives are constructed
in and through social interaction. Neimeyer and Sands (2011)
described how people organize the “seamless flow of life events,”
including negative happenings, into meaningful episodes that
reflect personally significant themes, and then seek validation for
this framework of meaning in the course of relating to others.
From a narrative point of view, individuals construct a life story
that is uniquely their own, yet unavoidably shaped by the social
discourse of their specific cultural context.
The ability to construct meaningful and consistent narratives
that illuminate and explain what is happening, at the individual,
familial, and societal levels, appears to be a fundamental
(pre)requisite for coping with any situation we may be presented
with. Narratives, metaphors, and the set of meanings they convey,
all contribute to establishing our sense of coherence.
The construct of sense of coherence (SOC), first proposed
by Antonovsky (1993, 1987, 1979), offers a helpful framework
for integrating personal and contextual factors. SOC is a stable
universal construct that applies to all genders, social classes, and
cultures (Sagy and Antonovsky, 2000; Eriksson and Lindström,
2005). It may be defined as a global predisposition reflecting the
degree to which an individual feels pervasively, lastingly, and
dynamically confident that internal and environmental stimuli
are structured, predictable, and explainable (comprehensibility);
that resources are available to meet the demands posed by these
stimuli (manageability); and that such demands are challenges
meriting investment and engagement (meaningfulness).
Accordingly, sense of coherence would appear to be a key
factor in our ability to deal with traumatic events such as the
COVID-19 emergency and its direct and indirect aftereffects
(Kimhi et al., 2010; Veronese et al., 2013; citation omitted for
anonymous peer review).
There is no doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic, which is
unprecedented in recent Western history, is a quintessential
instance of the “unknown”: one that defies all our usual sense-
making systems, challenging our “sense of coherence.” It thus
requires the construction of new meanings, as well as of new
routines, metaphors, and narratives, or–at the very least–a major
revisiting or re-adaptation of existing ones.
As expressed by Prime et al. (2020, p. 9) in a “hot-off-the-
press” paper on family well-being during COVID-19, “in recent
8Within this theoretical framework, Moscovici examined the process whereby
scientific theories are translated into, and permeate, “common-sense” knowledge.
weeks, families have encountered social disruption; family illness;
and, for many, death and grief. They will experience the highest
levels of adaptation when they are able to ‘make sense’ of the
disaster by incorporating the events into their existing worldview,
or by modifying their views, in a way that promotes health,
togetherness, and a sense of coherence.”
Significantly, Prime and colleagues view the family as playing
a key role in the process of meaning (re)construction, given
its status as the crucial point of intersection between the
individual and social dimensions. They propose a conceptual
framework based on systemic and ecological models of human
development and family functioning, in which they link the
social disruption (public health emergency, financial turmoil,
job losses) caused by COVID-19 to family–and particularly
child–adjustment, through a cascading process involving family
caregivers, family (sub)systems, and family processes (Prime
et al., 2020). A key construct in their work is “family resilience,”
a construct first developed by Walsh (1998, 2015), who–in
a critique of the individualistic “deficit model”–reinterpreted
the concept of resilience (traditionally viewed as an exclusively
individual trait) according to insights drawn from systemic family
therapy. “Walsh (1998, 2015) seminal work on family belief
systems in fostering resilience highlights three critical areas in
which family beliefs will be implicated in the response to COVID-
19: (a) meaning making of adversity, (b) fostering a positive
outlook, and (c) transcendence and spirituality” (Prime et al.,
2020, p. 9).
Despite its novel status, COVID-19 presents some similarities
to other traumatic events such as natural disasters, catastrophes,
terrorist attacks, wars, and traumatic loss (Prime et al., 2020),
all situations that elicit major distress (Veronese et al., 2010)
found that, in a context of ongoing warfare and protracted
political violence, the capacity to attribute sense and coherence
to uncertainty promoted a sense of efficacy and power. Hence,
the ability to construct meaning in uncertain and traumatic
conditions may be expected to enhance psychological well-being
and quality of life, mitigating the direct and indirect effects
of trauma caused by adverse conditions. Furthermore, clinical
theory on traumatic loss (Hooghe et al., 2012; Neimeyer et al.,
2014; Procaccia et al., 2018 citation omitted for anonymous peer
review) suggests that family systems and their crucial role in
meaning-making processes contribute to a more advanced ability
to make sense of adverse events.
The study of narratives can further our understanding of the
processes through which family members maintain or construct a
sense of resilience following a shared loss or, as in the case of the
current pandemic, a prolonged adverse situation. This is borne
out by the finding that mourners who succeeded in gradually
integrating their bereavement into their meaning systems report
fewer symptoms of complicated grief over the longer term
(citation omitted for anonymous peer review; Holland et al.,
2010; Procaccia et al., 2018).
Naturally, all of the factors in meaning making just outlined
can be influenced, and potentially significantly reinforced, by the
use of technological media. As observed in the “Critical Issues
for the Delivery of Psychological Assistance During the COVID-
19 Outbreak” section, new digital technologies can facilitate the
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work done in clinical settings; more generally, they can enhance
people’s everyday interaction with others. For example, they
can enable routines to be maintained that might otherwise be
interrupted due to physical distancing requirements, or they can
serve to convey and amplify narratives and metaphors, bringing
them to the attention of wide audiences, and they can even offer
a “laboratory” for the creation of new meanings.
In light of this background, how may the key coping factors we
have just described be enhanced to equip the broader population
for dealing with COVID-19?
ENHANCING PROCESSES OF MEANING
MAKING ABOUT COVID-19 IN THE
GENERAL POPULATION
One of the first areas requiring intervention is communication
strategy. As argued by many (Brooks et al., 2020; Holmes et al.,
2020), in a situation like the COVID-19 pandemic, all official
and media communications should be clear, consistent, and brief,
especially those concerning the practical rules to be followed in
the interest of avoiding infection and accelerating recovery from
the public health and economic crises. In practice, conflicting
messages delivered by media and government agencies in
many countries have posed an additional challenge to the
sense of coherence of the general population, especially in
terms of the perceived comprehensibility and manageability
of the pandemic (Antonovsky, 1996; citation omitted for
anonymous peer review, Veronese et al., 2013). With regard to
comprehensibility, inconsistent information about the nature of
COVID-19 undermines the perception that the phenomenon
is predictable and explainable. With regard to manageability,
confusing communications have prompted serious doubts about
the technical and practical resources available to address the
pandemic and its consequences.
Second, clinical intervention should foster the normalization
of psychological reactions to the pandemic. It seems reasonable
that–up to a certain degree–fear, anxiety, depressive mood,
sorrow, preoccupation, disappointment, insomnia, lessened or
increased appetite, inability to concentrate, and many other
distressful reactions should be viewed as natural responses
to the exceptional triggers generated by the COVID-19
emergency. As argued by Horwitz and Wakefield (2007, p. 9)
in relation to depressive symptoms arising in response to
adverse events, “such reactions, even when quite intense due
to the severity of the experience, are surely part of normal
human nature.” It is therefore difficult to justify the current
overreadiness to pathologize many “negative” reactions to
detrimental stimuli (see Schimmenti et al., 2020; Venuleo et al.,
2020). Of course, individuals can react very differently, in
terms of both intensity and type of response, depending on
a multitude of factors, including previous mental disorders,
disadvantaged circumstances, economic difficulties, membership
of discriminated-against minority groups, and so on (Johnstone
and Boyle, 2018; Prime et al., 2020), and some reactions may
be perceived as more “appropriate” than others with respect
to society’s standards of “normal.” In any case, we, here wish
to flag the risk of what Frances (2013) has termed diagnostic
hyperinflation, a phenomenon that entails the medicalization of
ordinary life. In the context of the current situation, an increase
in distress and requests for psychological support should be
generally viewed as an appropriate and proportional response to
extraordinary circumstances that have altered virtually all aspects
of everyday life. Thus, an uptick in demand for psychological
services might even be seen as desirable, to the extent that it
likely reflects self-awareness on the part of those undergoing
distress. At the same time, initial psychological assistance should
be characterized by active listening, with a view to allowing the
client’s needs to emerge and be expressed. As argued elsewhere
(citation omitted for anonymous peer review, Castiglioni and
Laudisa, 2015) in relation to depressive symptoms, throughout
the diagnostic process, practitioners should take careful account
of the traditional distinction between “endogenous” syndromes,
arising in the absence of any apparent external reason, and
“reactive” ones, triggered by negative external circumstances.
A third aspect, which is closely interconnected with the
second, concerns the crucial importance of widening the
observational field from individuals to their familial and social–
relational contexts (Watzlawick et al., 1967; Bateson, 1972) if
we are to fully understand the origins and nature of clients’
suffering and contribute to the effective resolution of their
difficulties. As argued above, the biomedical model tends to be
a-contextual, limiting its observational (and diagnostic) focus to
the individual. This is due to its implicit correlation with the so-
called “deficit model.” The latter posits that “psychopathology
is the result of dysfunction and distress, which are attributed
to some deficiency within the individual. Thus, the onus is
on the individual to enact certain changes to reduce distress
and dysfunction and consequently improve mental health”
(Anglin and Polanco-Roman, 2017, p. 998). In contrast with this
predominantly “illness-oriented” biomedical-deficit perspective,
more health-oriented paradigms (Antonovsky, 1996; Seligman
et al., 2005) emphasize the importance of promoting well-
being by focusing both on individuals’ personal strengths
and on the resources available to them in their contextual
environments, such as the earlier-cited factor of family resilience.
The outcomes of previous research on war settings by one
of the present authors (citations omitted for anonymous peer
review, Veronese et al., 2010, 2012, 2013) suggest that clinical
intervention should be designed to reinforce components of
positive functioning rather than to “rectify” behaviors, patterns
of thinking, or emotions perceived as maladaptive. In keeping
with the methodological principle of widening the field of
observation, clinical efforts should be directed at increasing
clients’ “social capital,” in terms of maximizing and leveraging
cohesion at the levels of family, networks of friends, and
community. Used to this end, participatory frameworks and
action research models can facilitate and enhance therapeutic
interventions focused on symptoms (Razer et al., 2009; Smith
and Romero, 2010). Overall, the emphasis should be on fostering
well-being and strengthening positive coping factors, with a
view to obtaining stronger outcomes in uncertain situations
without short-term solutions (Nguyen-Gillham et al., 2008;
Hunt, 2010).
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Group intervention offers a valuable means of targeting this
goal. We suggest that the formation of ad hoc peer groups–whose
meetings could be physical and/or technologically mediated
and would be led by a specialized psychologist, at least in the
earlier stages–may be key in this regard. Such groups–by sharing
their emotional experiences surrounding the pandemic and
activating the members’ personal resources–would counteract
the sense of meaninglessness and disconnectedness induced
by the decrease in the quality and quantity of interpersonal
interactions imposed by the COVID-19 emergency. Indeed, the
very fact of taking part in a group promotes a sense of being
connected to others, which is crucial in the current scenario
where individual behaviors are interdependent (in terms of
the mutual observance of safety measures), yet people have
far fewer opportunities to interact with one another (due to
lockdown arrangements and physical distancing rules). Among
their intrinsic therapeutic factors, groups can inspire hope, given
that they “invariably contain individuals who are at different
points along a coping-collapse continuum” (Yalom and Leszcz,
2005, p. 5): hence, mutual interaction among group members
may itself instill the hope of future improvements. Furthermore,
groups may foster a normalizing outlook on the personal issues
and distressful experiences generated by the pandemic: the
discovery that many issues and experiences are shared with
others could prompt the members of the group to broaden
their definition of “normal” (for examples of group interventions
fostering meaning-making processes, see Breitbart et al., 2010;
Lund et al., 2017). A particularly interesting format recently
developed in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is W I I
Thrive,9 a group-centered approach aimed at enhancing human
dignity and well-being with integrity. Within this framework,
individuals are encouraged to form peer groups with a view
to connecting with and supporting each other and discussing
the challenges of adaptive living, on the basis of a shared
set of ideas, values, and practices (G. R. Henriques, personal
communication, 28 May 2020).
Finally, spirituality, in terms of either religious beliefs and
rituals or a sense of “connectedness” to nature, art, beauty, etc.,
has been identified as an additional key resource for coping,
healing, and fostering personal, familial, and group resilience
(Delgado, 2007; Walsh, 2010; Prime et al., 2020). In brief, active
social and personal engagement with spiritual and/or religious
experiences may contribute to maintaining an adequate sense
of coherence, and thus to coping better with psychological
distress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting
socioeconomic crisis (Drageset et al., 2008).
Fourth, interventions aimed at restoring and fostering well-
being should focus on processes of meaning construction, drawing
on metaphors, and narratives that orient clients in coping
with the pandemic and its long-term consequences. Let us
consider the “metaphor of war” as an example of this kind of
meaning-making process, bearing in mind that the performative
9W I I stands for “We” (referring to one’s relationships with others), “I”
(individuality and subjectivity), “It” (referring both to the natural world and
human technological and scientific understanding of it). Thriving refers to a state
of flourishing, optimal functioning, and fulfillment across all levels of analysis and
time frames (see https://www.wiithrive.com/home).
power of communication and language enables us to “do things
with words” (Austin, 1962).
Throughout this paper, we have more than once drawn a
parallel between how people may be affected by the COVID-19
pandemic and the impact on individuals and communities of
ongoing armed conflict. It is not by chance that one of the
figures most widely used in the media (as well as in everyday
conversations among people) to describe the current health
emergency has been the war metaphor: we are engaged in a war
against an “invisible enemy” (the virus), a war that has its own
soldiers, prisoners, heroes, martyrs, traitors, victims, and fallen.
Vedovelli (in Milesi, 2020) has critiqued the pervasive use of this
metaphorical device, arguing that it risks generating a climate
of suspicion, closures, barriers, and clashes. On the contrary,
Battistelli (2020), while recognizing the potential insidiousness of
the “pandemic as a war” metaphor, has pointed to its effectiveness
in conveying a notion of serious threat to people’s safety, health,
and lives, thus spurring us to join forces in combatting the
disease. In Vedovelli’s view, social communications should be
aimed, on the one hand, at making the “inexpressible” (the
invisible enemy) understandable through the logos of scientific
discourse and, on the other, at generating and supporting social
relations. The debate between these two scholars illustrates how
different metaphors give rise to different narratives and sets of
meanings, potentially orienting the way in which we experience,
interpret, and deal with the pandemic.
Of course, in our opinion, other metaphors could be viable,
too. For example, the metaphor of the journey (Polkinghorne,
2004), which portrays us as currently traveling over very rough
terrain with no reliable map, or the bereavement metaphor
(Neimeyer et al., 2011), whereby, as a community, we have joined
together to mourn our previous way of life, hoping that a new
alternative will soon emerge, or the “man-as-scientist” metaphor
(Kelly, 1955), according to which we all strive to predict and
gain control of events, for example, by researching the causes of
this unprecedented phenomenon and studying new solutions for
overcoming or managing it. However, the range of metaphors
available in a certain cultural context are not infinite. Given
that meaning-making processes are embedded in their social–
cultural and historical contexts, to some extent, “the affective
interpretation of the insurgence of the pandemic scenario, rather
than depending on the inherent characteristics of COVID-19,
reflects the patterns of affective meanings grounding the cultural
milieu at the moment in which the interpretation was enacted”
(Venuleo et al., 2020, p. 124).
All these metaphors produce different narratives and
interpretations, which in turn may prompt different attitudes
and behaviors. In the context of clinical intervention, the
practitioner can negotiate suitable personalized metaphors
with the client.
CLINICAL VIGNETTES
We now present two clinical vignettes with a view to practically
illustrating–although in brief–some aspects of the clinical
perspective outlined in the last section.
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The first vignette thematizes the normalization
of distressful experiences generated by the COVID-
19 pandemic and the value of widening the field of
observation to include the client’s present and past contextual
environment.
C., an only child, is a 49-year-old married woman with
two children, one of whom displays difficult personality
traits. She lives with her family in the suburbs of Milan.
At the age of nine, she lost her father, a farmer, and spent
her youth with her mother, a woman – then in her late
forties – without a formal education. At the age of 20, she
met her husband, whom she describes as “a strong man
you can rely on.” However, she has somehow always felt
inferior to him: she still believes that she was lucky he
“chose her, a simple country girl.” She is now employed by
a state-owned enterprise.
During the COVID-19 home confinement, she discovered
that she had been in contact with an elderly woman
who later passed away due to coronavirus. As required
by governmental regulations, C. reached out to the local
health authority to report what had happened. She was very
worried about her own health status and tried to gather
information about the possible consequences of infection.
She relayed that the health professionals she spoke with –
first by phone and later in person – had displayed a
highly detached attitude. In their interactions with her,
they focused solely on what had happened during the brief
contacts C. had had with the deceased woman and on the
measures to be taken as a result. C. was clearly distressed by
the situation but had the impression that her concerns were
largely being ignored. When healthcare personnel finally
called her home, she described their attitude as cold and
“medical.” The team’s protective attire and scant verbal
interactions with C. – while consulting frequently among
themselves – all contributed to making her feel even more
“psychologically distant” from the very people she was
relying on to take care of her. C. began to believe that
her worries were excessive and stopped “trying to make an
emotional connection” with the health professionals, from
whom she had initially expected a word of comfort. In
the weeks following the in-home meeting, one of the team
phoned her regularly once a week, but kept the conversation
firmly focused on her observation of the confinement rules
and on recording “objective parameters” (temperature,
presence of breathing difficulties, etc.). C. shut down during
these calls and only spoke to answer the questions put to her
by the health worker. She began to think that her worries
were “wrong” and unworthy of attention.
Although she was developing an increasingly judgmental
attitude toward herself, she also progressively felt the need
to share what had happened with someone who would
really listen to her. Her husband was not a candidate
given that he tended to minimize and trivialize her
emotional concerns.
When she first met one of the authors for a consultation,
her sense of being emotionally incompetent was evident.
She stated that “normal people react differently,” while she
herself “couldn’t stop crying during the lockdown, like a
kid.” At first, she was unable to connect the extraordinary
nature of the disruption to her everyday routines with
the emotional reactions that had followed. The habitual
meanings underpinning her self-assessments (“You’re just
a country girl,” “You don’t know how the world works,”
“You must be wrong to feel or think this,” and “Stop
crying and complaining”) continued to prevail over any
objective evaluation of the situation. The aim of the
initial sessions was to listen closely and nonjudgmentally
to her account and help her to link her emotional
reactions to what had actually happened: drawing out this
connection was intended to normalize her experiences,
making them more understandable and acceptable to her
(see the normalization criterion). This required the clinician
to adopt a widened perspective that encompassed the
personal, familial, cultural, and social contexts in which the
sources of the client’s distress had come into play. In light
of these contextual features, the clinician guided the client
toward developing a more comprehensive understanding of
her life conditions. He did so by encouraging the client to
view her thoughts and emotions as reactions to (internal
and external) stimuli, rather than as manifestations of an
inner and immutable deficit (see the criterion of widening
the observational field). The practitioner also sought to
enhance the client’s awareness that these reactions had been
strongly influenced by her personal history by fostering
the construction of an alternative narrative framework,
and specifically the view that the client had attempted
to cope with an unprecedented series of unpredictable
events based on the personal resources she felt she could
count on. Such resources were deeply rooted in her own
proximal and distal history and profoundly influenced
the ways available to her for dealing with the events
of the pandemic: the clinician noted that she could not
have reacted any differently, given the exceptional nature
of the events and the (personal, psychological, familial,
social) resources at her disposal. To this end, he made
connections between C.’s history and her present concerns.
The clinician also made extensive use of a metaphorical
analogy, drawing from the client’s personal history. Because
the client’s mother had been bitterly critical toward her
and excessively demanding considering her daughter’s age
(“an inflexible schoolmistress,” in the shared language of
the therapy), the client was continuously at risk of adopting
the same attitude toward herself, and focusing exclusively
on performance (“You should have done better!”) rather
than taking into account the unfavorable conditions she
had been obliged to face (“I could not have behaved or
thought differently, considering that. . .”). This negotiated
and reiterated metaphor helped the client to develop a
strong sense of kindness toward the much-criticized little
girl that she had been and to transfer this to a considerable
extent to her “adult-self.” This, in turn, fostered the
development of a nonjudgmental, positive attitude toward
herself and her emotional life more generally, helping her
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567419
fpsyg-11-567419 October 23, 2020 Time: 16:15 # 10
Castiglioni and Gaj Fostering the Reconstruction of Meaning
to make new sense of the difficulties she had encountered in
the process of coping with the pandemic (see the criterion
of fostering meaning-making processes through the use of
narratives and metaphors).
The second vignette, while also confirming the importance
of contextual factors, touches more specifically upon the role of
community resilience and the mitigating effects of experiencing
connectedness and transcendence.
F., an only child, is a 39-year-old single woman who has
been living in Milan for the past 10 years. Her family
is wealthy and highly cultured; she herself is very bright
and has broad cultural interests. Her parents have been
always emotionally unreliable: in her everyday interactions
with them, they display an unpredictable mix of support,
indifference, and offensiveness. She attended university
in another town, where she felt unable to live up to
her parents’ expectation that she should be independent.
During this troubled university period, she began taking
drugs and abusing alcohol. A few years later, after hitting
a particularly low point, she decided to give up drugs, and
did so successfully and on her own. After completing her
studies, she planned to pursue her longstanding dream
of working abroad. However, the sudden news that her
mother was seriously ill interrupted this project, and she
decided not to leave so she could care for her mother. In
recent years, she has worked on and off and decided to
enroll at university again, although she feels like “a fish
out of water.” Nevertheless, she has recently experienced a
“pleasant sense of continuity” from devoting herself to work
and recreational activities that “at last have meaning.”
The COVID-19 home confinement hit F. hard. On the
one hand, she became increasingly concerned about the
social and personal effects of the pandemic, worries that
were exacerbated by news stories in the media, which she
followed incessantly during the lockdown period. On the
other hand, her sense of disconnect – which habitually
took the form of feeling “unusual” or “odd” (on account
of still attending university in her late thirties, being
able to afford not to have a proper job, having unusual
and varied cultural interests, etc.) – was progressively
exacerbated by a lack of interaction with others due to the
home confinement measures. Her sense of personal identity
gradually became more fragile, in the absence of habitual
reference points such as interpersonal interactions, daily
routines, work, and recreational activities. She felt that the
continuity in her life – which she had finally achieved after
“meaningless years without building anything significant” –
was in danger: the temporary disruption of her routines
had triggered a sense of meaninglessness, associated with
low mood, hypersomnia/insomnia, hypervigilance, and
occasional convulsive crying.
F. found unexpected relief when – by chance – she
tuned into an independent radio station, whose contents
she perceived as surprisingly in harmony with her own
worldview and interests. Day after day, F. felt increasingly
more connected, reporting the clear perception that “there
are people out there that I feel connected with: I’m not alone
anymore!” She perceived this connection to be profound,
rooted in the arts, human values, and cultural interests.
Her contact and interactions with the radio presenters and
their guests – although mediated by technology – had the
effect of “turning something around.” First, the distress F.
reported having experienced gradually remitted; second,
she became determined to stop delaying completion of
her university course and decided to seriously devote
herself to her studies. In view of the above, F. requested a
psychological consultation.
During the first session with the clinician, F. displayed a
generally disparaging attitude toward herself, behaving as
though she expected the clinician to judge her for being
“odd” and “unusual.” The clinician challenged this “given”
definition of herself, asking the client to explain what she
meant by “odd” or “unusual.” Their ongoing exchanges
on this topic progressively led the client to acknowledge
that her “isolation made her feel like she was ‘unique,’
in the negative sense of the word”. She also recognized
that she might have been feeling like this because she
had hardly ever had the opportunity to meet people with
similar interests and cultural awareness before tuning into
the radio station (see the criterion of normalization). This
discussion with the practitioner encouraged the client to do
a “reality check” (as she evocatively said) and to “come out
of my own narrow subjective perspective” (cit.) to consider
the possibility that her personal experience – although
private – could, nonetheless, be shared with many other
individuals, at least on the basis of “our common human
nature” (see the criterion of widening the observational
field). This gradually led F. to develop a more appreciative
attitude toward herself, as well as toward her own areas
of knowledge, interests, and personal resources, in general.
The practitioner pointed out to her that these resources can
be useful for coping with reality, even in the face of an
unprecedented event such as the pandemic: he connected
the challenges of the present time with her skills and
capacities. These comments were received with a mixture
of suspicion and curiosity, and progressively fostered
the construction of new meanings related to the events
surrounding the pandemic. F. began to perceive herself
differently, as “more resilient,” and found the courage to
leave her home to safely meet other people. Borrowed from
a popular saying, a metaphor emerged in the course of
therapy, thus formulated by F.: “we are all experiencing the
same storm. We are not in the same boat though: some
people are sailing in fancy yachts with all the comforts,
others in flimsy cheap rowing boats. Everyone is reacting
in their own way to this pandemic, and there’s nothing
wrong with that. I know I have to take care of my boat, the
same as everyone else. Still, F., don’t forget there’s a storm
out there!” (see the criterion of fostering meaning-making
processes through the use of narratives and metaphors). This
metaphor expressed F.’s gradually developing awareness of
being personally responsible for her life decisions.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Undoubtedly, the dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
on the mental health of the general population gives much cause
for concern. Individuals, families, and communities have been
cast back on their own resources on an unprecedented scale.
In light of this scenario, we have attempted to sketch out a
perspective on psychological intervention that we believe to be
appropriate for addressing the crisis and its aftermath.
In summary, clinical interventions aimed at relieving the
distressful consequences of the pandemic should fulfill a set of
general, but crucial, criteria:
1. Flexibility. There should be scope for interventions to
address forms of distress whose manifestations are blurred
and/or milder than expected, and do not necessarily fully
conform to any specific diagnosis.
2. Personalization. Interventions should be informed by an
assessment of symptoms that takes the client’s underlying
meaning systems into account, given that similar adverse
stimuli may hold very different meanings for different
individuals and in different contexts. Attending to the
dimension of meaning should not exclude the use of
symptom-centered techniques where required.
3. Extended focus. Interventions should conceptually link
the development of mental problems to external triggers
and stressors ascribable to the interpersonal domain (vs.
solely internal triggers ascribable to the internal and/or
biological domain). This is what we have defined as
widening the field of observation to situate events (such
as the client’s complaints or symptoms) within their
interpersonal contexts and promote an understanding
of distressful experiences as strategies for coping with
objective external challenges.
4. Emphasis on positive resources. Intervention should foster
awareness of personal, familial, and social resources and
their deployment to develop personalized coping strategies,
in a shift away from exclusively deficit- and disorder-
centered outlooks.
We believe that all practitioners, independently of their
clinical orientations, may benefit from adopting these
overarching criteria. Our recommendations are not in conflict
with the theoretical and methodological specifics of the
various clinical approaches. Rather, we advocate for a broader
psychological perspective on forms of distress associated with the
negative cascade of events that has ensued upon the COVID-19
outbreak, suggesting that they call for a departure from more
classically disorder-oriented and deficit-centered outlooks. In
short, our ultimate purpose is to contribute to the debate on how
traditional forms of clinical intervention may best be adapted to
the novel contextual factors being shaped by the pandemic.
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